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DUALISTIC DEVELOPMENT IN UAE AND GCC1
Suleiman Ibrahim Cohen2
Abstract.  This  paper  attempts  to  draw  up  and  apply  an  analytical  framework  for  tracing  and 
understanding duality features in the resource rich labour short developing country. The focus is on UAE 
and GCC,. The framework is guided by (a) a simple model at the macro level that highlights duality 
tendencies  in  terms  of  the  composition  of  high  skilled  and  low  skilled  labour  and  their  diverging 
productivities, and (b) an inter-industry analysis at the sector level.
     The paper elaborates further on whether dualistic development matters; and if it matters, what should 
be the optimal degree of  dualism in a given context.  As there is  no simple  answer to this  issue an 
empiricist approach is followed by which various comparative indicators relating to duality are reviewed, 
rescaled and aggregated for UAE and GCC.  The indicators show a significantly higher duality of UAE 
than in neighbouring countries.  
       Duality in UAE is explained in terms of a more open market for foreign labour and capital that reinforce 
each other, and which have highly contrasting and opposite effects on factor productivity; next to built-in 
inter-industry mechanisms that work in the same direction.  
1. Introduction
By a dualistic economy is meant a highly structured economy containing a relatively concentrated modern 
segment with high and rising factor productivities, next to a traditional segment covering many workers in 
tiny enterprises  with  low and declining  productivities.  The  notion has  wide application to  developing 
countries  with  poor  natural  resources  and  an  oversupply  of  labour,  and  is  basic  to  theorizing  and 
understanding the process of development in these countries, Kelly et al. (1089). 
         In general, there has been little attention devoted to the emergence of duality features and problems in 
developing countries with rich natural resources and an undersupply of labour such as the GCC.  Focusing 
on UAE in particular, this paper attempts to draw up and apply a framework for tracing and understanding 
duality features in the resource rich labour short developing country. The framework is guided by (a) a 
simple model at the macro level that highlights duality tendencies in terms of the composition of more 
1 Paper is for presentation at Annual Meeting of the Middle East Economics Association to be held January 4-6, 2008 in 
New Orleans, LA, USA.  
2 Professor of economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands..   The paper draws on previous work done by 
the author at TANMIA and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Dubai.  Opinions expressed are those of the 
author. The author is thankful for inputs by and discussions with A. Abdel  Karim.
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skilled and less skilled labour and their diverging productivities, and (b) an analysis at the sector level that 
identifies sectors behind the increasing dualities. 
       The paper elaborates further on whether a dualistic development matters; and if it matters, what should 
be the optimal degree of dualism in a given context. 
       The paper then extends the scope of duality to consider the relative performances of what can be called 
the ‘old’ economy and the ‘new’ economy.  The latter is technologically much more advanced, is more 
information based, and is more recent in its evolvement and growth.  An empiricist approach is followed by 
which various comparative indicators relating to duality of the old and new are reviewed, rescaled and 
aggregated for UAE and GCC.  The indicators will show a significantly higher duality in UAE than in GCC: 
i.e. a lagging old economy in UAE compared to GCC, but a much more advanced and leaping new economy 
in UAE compared to GCC.  
2. A macro level analysis of dualistic development in GCC type countries
Dualistic models, developed by Lewis and Ranis in the 1950’s, were rightly applied to the classic case of 
a resource poor surplus labour developing country. The premises of the model are (a) a large population 
in the traditional agriculture sector earning an income above marginal productivity, so that an outflow of 
labour will  not affect  production;  (b)  firms in the modern industrial  sector,  working with increasing 
capital  intensity,  will  hire  and  train  this  labour  surplus  and  pay  a  wage  equal  to  their  marginal 
productivity. The development process is then seen as a transfer of labour from the low productivity 
sector to the high productivity sector, with a likely widening of the dualistic gap between the two sectors, 
other things remaining the same.  Due to this duality, economic growth may not necessarily signal a 
general improvement in welfare for all participants. Under favourable conditions and over time counter 
transfers and linked markets can occur, thus contributing to an integration of the economy and a more 
equitably distributed welfare.  
       In the last five decades dualistic analysis was extended to cover the division between the formal and 
informal sectors, as well as emphasis on marginalisation tendencies, and urban bias.  cf. Sethurahman 
(1981), de Soto (1989), and Lipton (1977), respectively. But the main contours distinguishing dualism in 
the  overpopulated  poor  developing  country  remained  intact:  the  coexistence  of  a  low  productivity 
lagging sector housing the larger portion of a less skilled labour force, next to a high productivity growth 
sector with skilled labour. 
     We attempt here to formulate an analytical framework for dualistic development for the case of the 
resource rich labour short developing country, for example the UAE, or generally the GCC. The formal-
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informal dichotomy and its manifestations are also common in this rich region, though the mechanisms 
behind this dualism are totally different from the classical case of the poor country. 
       To start with, a simplified macro model of dualistic development in GCC context in six equations is 
displayed. This is a conceptual model meant to catch the very basic features.  These are (a) the exogenous 
effects of favourable oil revenues on the modern economy, in particular higher consumption, higher capital 
intensive investment,  and often outward growth in  invisible  services,  requiring import  of  foreign high 
productivity skilled manpower  at  world market  clearance rates  whereby remuneration equals  marginal 
productivity;  (b) the modern economy imports as well foreign unskilled labour with a lower opportunity 
cost than its marginal productivity; (c) this foreign unskilled labour falls back on a traditional economy for 
their consumption needs given their low levels of remuneration and high remittances; and (d) this creating 
furthermore a multiplier demand effect for more foreign unskilled labour in the informal economy to satisfy 
its increased consumption demands .
      The result of (a) to (d) is a heightened expansion of both the modern and traditional economies, more 
foreign labour inflow, and relatively more so of low skills than high skills, coupled with a growth in wage 
discrepancies between the high and low productivity labour types. 
       Eq. 1 gives the GDP of the modern economy (non-oil), Vm, as the sum of consumption, investment and 
exports less imports.  Consumption and investment depend on the GDP of oil and non-oil. This equation 
determines Vm from the demand side. Eq.2 determines the stock of capital in the modern economy Km. Eq.3 
determines the input of low skills in the modern economy, Lm, which is a wage bill divided by a sort of 
exogenous minimum wage  Wl that is equivalent to the opportunity cost of low skilled in the migrants’ 
countries. Eq. 4 is a production function. With Vm, Km and Lm solved, the input of high skills Hm is derived 
from this production function.3  Turning to the traditional economy, eq.5 specifies the composition of its 
GDP, Vn, as consisting of some consumption demand by the modern economy; consumption demand by 
low skills who are assumed to spend their disposable income on traditional goods; and some investment in 
the traditional sector.  In eq. 6, employment in the traditional economy, Ln, is found from the wage share and 
the exogenous minimum wage, and by adding up other exogenously known categories of informal workers 
consisting of household helpers and unregistered workers, Ln1 and Ln2, respectively. 
A macro model highlighting dualistic features in a resource rich labour short developing country 
Indices: o , m, n  subscripts for oil, modern and traditional sectors, respectively.  
Endogenous variables: V= Value added,  K=  Capital,   H= High skilled labour,  
L= Low skilled labour (Lm in modern sector and Ln in traditional sector) 
3 This equation can generate also the remuneration rate of high skills, Wh, based on competitive assumptions that assure 
that the remuneration rate equals marginal productivity in case of Hm.
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Exogenous variables: Vo=value added of oil sector, Em= exports less imports of modern sector, Wl  = 
wage low skilled, Ln1. Ln2 = Informal sector household helpers and unregistered workers 
Coefficients: α , β  = marginal productivities of capital and high skilled labour
γ , ι = functional parameters for consumption and investment, δ = depreciation rate of capital
ρ = remittance share in labour income, pi = profit share in value added 
Equations:
Vm  =  γm (Vm + Vo )  +  ι m ( Vm + Vo )  + Em                                              (1) 
Km = (1- δm )  K m, t-1 +  ι m ( Vm + Vo )                                                        (2)
Lm =  (1−α−β)   Vm /   Wl                                                                                                 (3)
Vm  =  Am Kmα  Hm β   Lm (1−α−β)                                                                        (4)
Vn = γn Vm  + ( 1- ρn) Wl ( Lm + Ln )  + ιn Vn                                                (5)
Ln = (1+λn ) (pin  Vn  / Wl)  + Ln1 + Ln2                                                           (6)
 
3.  A macro interpretation of recent trends in terms of dual sectors.  
 An indication of an increasing duality can be derived from the model in various ways.  One way is to 
examine a simple comparison between the trend of the wage rate of the high productivity labour that can be 
denoted by Wh and that can be derived from eq.1, and the wage rate of the low productivity labour Wl. The 
ratio of Wh to Wl tended to increase in recent years in the UAE, indicating a rise in duality. This is the result 
of a wage rate paid to the high skill that is equal to its marginal productivity, while the wage rate for the low 
skill is settled at a value equal to the opportunity cost of the low skilled in neighbouring countries that supply 
this  labour,  increased  by  the  transaction  costs  required  to  travel  and  obtain  a  work  license.  As  this 
opportunity cost tended to fall in recent years, the wage rate of the low skilled Wl  has also fallen in real 
terms and well below their marginal productivity. 
        Another measure of the increasing duality can be found in weighing the growth rates of Wh and Wl by 
the changing shares of H and L in the total labour force. This gives a measure of the changing concentration 
of income shares. In UAE, and for many years, there has been a greater growth in the number of low skilled 
L than in that of high skilled H; and given the widened gap between Wl and Wh, it can be postulated that the 
income distribution in UAE is likely to be more skew over time, implying an increase in duality. 
     Of course, a shortcut for tracing duality would be simply to relate the growth of labour productivity 
in the modern to the traditional sectors. The problem is that it is not operationally feasible at the macro 
level to separate and estimate the production of the two sectors apart, and that is why the sketched macro 
model is basically a conceptual tool. However, an indirect indication of the increasing duality can be 
4
obtained from an aggregate picture combined with other observd facts. Table 3.1 shows for six recent 
years a decline in the aggregate labour productivity to 70% of its initial value, or an average decline of 
about 0.7% per year.  Given the earlier mentioned positive growth in labour productivity in the modern 
sector as reflected by the icreasing remuneration rate of the high skilled and their marginal pructivity, 
then the labour productivity in the traditional sector must have diminished appreciably over the years, to 
allow for this aggregate annual decline in labour productivity of  0.7%.   
 Table 3.1.  Trends in labour productivity, UAE
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998/93
GDP non-oil, mln aed 137659 140913 148679 164256 166884 154804 1.12
Labour 000s 859717 940844 1216854 1273750 1329503 1378495 1.60
Labour productivity 0.160 0.150 0.122 0.129 0.126 0.112 0.70
Growth of lab. productivity 0.935 0.816 1.055 0.973 0.895 0.935  (av)
Source:  Compiled from Annual Economic Reports, Ministry of Planning. GDP at factor cost constant prices of 
1990.
 
       In the six years, there is a net addition of about 514000 workers, practically all of them are migrant 
workers, with much of them absorbed by the traditional sector.  The figures would imply that a large part of 
the inflow of migrant workers in recent years did not bring an added value to the economy, and must have 
gone to activities of lower productivity such as usually spread in the traditional sector. 
      How to justify and unify analytically the highly contrasting pictures on labour productivity in UAE?  On 
the one hand, there are the trends showing deterioration in productivity. On the other hand, there is observed 
evidence on a healthy and growing economy. How can these contrasting pictures be unified?    The logical 
harmonisation of these contrasting facts is in recognising that economic activities in UAE consist of highly 
heterogeneous types of employed labour and capital, and that disaggregation of these activities into a leaping 
commercially-run modern segment and a lagging traditional segment will uncover important realities.  The 
lion’s  share  of  the  declining  labour  productivity  occurs  in  the  lagging  segment,  which  has  attracted 
significant inflows of foreign workers that are not matched with corresponding increases in the value added. 
High degrees of overcrowding and underutilisation are among the manifestations. Several mechanisms in 
the two segments sare described below . 
     The modern economy.   High growth due to oil revenues, high investment and increased invisible 
exports  lead to a pattern of  capital  intensive  investment  that  raises  demand for  high skills  but  also 
substitutes capital for labour, with the net effect being a positive demand for high skills Hm, as implied 
in eqs.1, 2, 4. What is the case for low skills Lm? In the eighties and early nineties the country's labour 
market was relatively tight leading to higher wages and lower returns on capital.  With a more open 
labour  market  since  then,  there  has  been  a  significant  influx  of  cheap  labour  from  low-income 
neighbouring countries, which producers appreciate. There is a large stock of labour in neighbouring 
countries with low opportunity costs and they are prepared to pay a premium to be allowed to migrate, 
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enter the labour force and earn a basic income. One and the other have lead to a decline in the general 
level of low skilled wages and a rise in profits. While labour productivity is falling, business profitability 
has  increased  because  of  the  intensified  wage  competition  among the  lower  skills  leading  to  more 
employment Lm4, eq.3. The greater use of Lm may have substituted for some Hm as well, eq.4, causing 
a further relative downgrading of the skill profile.
       The traditional economy. All workers in the traditional economy Ln can be assumed to be of a low 
productivity equivalent to Lm.  Note that Lm is low productivity but they are aligned with the modern 
segment, while eqs. 5 and 6 deal with other low skill in the traditional segment, Ln.  There are several 
common things about these categories apart from having the same low skill description.  All L categories 
receive W per worker which is equivalent to a low opportunity cost that applies in the countries of 
migration. All L categories remit a substantial share of their income, r, back to the migrant country.  All 
L categories spend their consumption on low productivity goods and services provided by the informal 
sector.  
      Among the low skilled informal workers, a distinction can be made between Ln1, Ln2, Ln3. These 
are household helpers, unregistered workers, and the core informal workers in tiny enterprises catering 
for production and services to low income earners.5 They are discussed below.
      One category of informal workers is that of foreign housemaids, cooks, gardeners, and drivers. This 
group increased appreciably due  to the increased demand by higher income households and the modern 
business sector for these household services. According to the population census of 1995, household helpers 
counted 104 thousands, good for about 10% of foreign employment.6 The importing household head submits 
a request to the authorities to fetch a household helper, which request is granted.  There is no formal market 
for these transactions and the household head assumes legal and residential responsibilities for the imported 
labour.   To some extent, there may not be a realisable conversion of the earned income of these informal 
workers into an additional value added to the GDP. It is also less likely that the spending households would 
increase their  own productivity appreciably and fully as a result  of  the personal service.   Under these 
circumstances a substantial part of these informal earnings can as well be interpreted as a redistribution of 
income  from spender  to  receiver,  or  as  being a  leaking  expenditure  on  imports  from abroad  that  are 
physically delivered and consumed in the importing country. The case of an informal worker who does not 
contribute to production, but via his spending, generates demand for more labour inputs of other to maintain 
4 While this can be advantageous from the private point of view in the short run, it may discourage labour-saving 
technological investments and curb economic growth in the long run.
5  Migrant workers whose labour contract expired and stay illegally in the country may form from 15% to 30% of 
the labour force.  They belong mostly to the low productivity skill.  Since they are by definition distributed on 
categories Lm, and Ln1, Ln2, and Ln3, they are thus indirectly accounted for in the model.
6Citizens from India, Sri Lanka, Phillipines and Pakistan supply this category.  Household helpers are distributed as 
follows: Abu Dhabi 40%, and Dubai 26%, among others..  
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his living, would lead to a further artificial surge of labour supply in the traditional sector, falling labour 
productivity and rising duality. 
        Another category of foreign workers, which can be considered informal in a regulatory sense, 
consists of foreign workers who are permitted to earn an income without registering as an establishment, 
mostly in agriculture, fishing and transport. According to the population census of 1995, workers without 
establishments counted 119 thousands, which is another 10% of foreign employment.7  The profile of 
these workers is for more than 90% unskilled. However, these are capable of generating a value added; 
though it can be expected that in most cases such a value added is not much above what is necessary to 
cover basic needs. 
         The two categories above are not subjected to the usual clearance procedures that apply to other 
foreign workers, which require issue of business licenses, by municipal authorities, and subsequentl granting 
of work permits by Ministry of Labour. The nature of their work is different and the corresponding policies 
towards  them differ  from those  for  other  foreign  workers.  But  the  more  lenient  procedures  towards 
admission has enhanced their inflow and contributed to an accentuation of the productivity gap and dualistic 
development.
        A more important category of informal workers are those manning tiny enterprises engaged in the 
production of low cost goods and services that are predominantly consumed by the low productivity 
labour  who  have  an  equally  low  purchasing  power.  These  are  enterprises  that  are governed  by  a 
combination of economic motivations and social ties, and that can afford to increase employment of 
unpaid  or  partially  paid  family  dependants,  relatives  and  close  relations,  cheaply  brought  from 
neighbouring countries at little extra cost for the proprietor. In the context of a small family-run business, 
once the proprietor/ head of the family has succeeded in securing a business license and in setting an 
establishment site, it becomes more attractive for the proprietor to fetch dependants from overseas, cover 
their living expenses,  allocate work to them, and enhance the proprietor's esteem, than to engage in 
periodical income transfers via remittances abroad.  The types of activities and occupations typical of the 
traditional segment are handicrafts, simple manufacturing processes, and retail and food kiosks.  The 
enterprises have very little capital, are highly labour intensive, have low turnovers and their clients have 
a low purchasing power. With this bleak perspective in mind, this informal segment has been called by 
some as the marginalised segment, de Soto (1989).  Obviously, this segment, by importing more foreign 
labour at the same level of activity, will be a cause for a diminishing labour productivity and increased 
dualism. 
7 This category is dominated by foreign workers from Pakistan, about 45%. Farmers and fisherman are the major 
occupations, about 50%, followed by production and service workers in transport and trade. The over majority of the 
category is unskilled, about 92 %, with the skilled forming only 8%.  The foreign workers without establishments are 
mostly in Abu Dhabi, 50%, followed by Dubai, 22%.
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        There is more information on the profile of the informal sector, based on a sample survey organised 
by MOL among 407 establishments of 1 to 10 workers in 1998, which were appropriately scrutinised to 
separate those in the traditional  sector from those that  are oriented towards the modern sector.  The 
stratification yielded slightly more than 40 % of the establishments classified as informal and about 60% 
for  modern.8 The  survey  shows  the  traditional  sector  to  be  a  cradle  for  the  low  and  decreasing 
productivity performance, which characterised the economy in recent years. The over majority of the low 
productivity establishments,  76%,  had an initial  capital  well  below the minimum required for  listed 
companies, 40% experienced a decreasing turnover, and the establishments reported on average more 
than one obstacle for future growth.  The traditional sector depended predominantly on family labour, 
mostly unpaid, and brought in from abroad. The skill profile of the remunerated workers is remarkably 
low. 
       Another interesting detail is that the survey contained another 81 establishments run by nationals. 
Application  of  the  same  stratification  procedures  to  these  divided  national  establishments  into  a 
traditional segment of only 9%, while the modern profile accounted for 91%, testifying to a much lower 
performance configuration among the foreign as compared to the national.
       There is supplementary evidence that indicates a strong bias of small firms to attract foreign workers 
from abroad,  as compared to larger firms.  Another survey conducted an inquiry about the required 
inflow of additional foreign workers in the three years following 1996.9  The results show that the small 
firms (below 10 workers) reported a required increase of 151% on their base employment; while it is 
evident ex-post that there were no prospective economic grounds for justifying such excessive increases. 
The intentions can be partly understood in the light of non-economic motives to boost the demand for 
family related foreign workers.   The above figure can be compared with the more realistic required 
increase that firms with more than 10 workers have projected: only 55 %.  The bias of small firms to 
overuse foreign labour is likely to be a major cause of the low labour productivity and duality tendencies. 
        One final point concerns the UAE economy as a whole. The profile of the inflow of attracted 
foreign labour in terms of education, skill and economic activity is remarkably lower than that of the 
stock to which the flow is added, and this result in a further reduction of the labour productivity in skill 
equivalent terms. In table 3.2, the comparative educational profiles for several categories of active labour 
are shown. To quote some figures: the ratio of low to high education among male expatriates working in 
production  is  9.8,  roughly  10  to  1.   The  ratio  for  nationals  is  3.7.  The  educational  gap  between 
expatriates and nationals is less for workers in services and is significantly reversed for government.  
       Finally, the low turnover of migrant workers10 downgrades the educational profile further.
8 The survey is reported upon in various reports issued by TANMIA, see references.
9 A Strategy for Emiratization, published by UAE University, 1997.
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 Table 3.2.  Ratio of workers with low education to those with high education, by nationality and 
gender, UAE.  1995
Nationality Gender Production Services Government
Nationals   N Male M 3.73 2.88 8.69
Female F 0.79 0.42 1.48
Expatriates E Male M 9.83 3.69 4.74
Female F 6.99 2.32 0.99
Source:  The ratios are calculated from a Human Resource Development Matrix for 1995, in Ibrahim, S. (2000). 
Low education is secondary and below, high education is college and above.
4. An inter-industry analysis of dualistic accents in UAE
Insight into duality tendencies can be gained also from a multiplier analysis of an updated input-output 
table for UAE.  The input-output table, which was constructed for Abu Dhabi for 1995, cf. UNDP-UN-
DESA (1999), has been updated using the RAS method so as to represent the whole economy of UAE 
for 2003. 
    The I.O. table allows calculating technical coefficients that give the deliveries of intermediate goods 
of sector i to sector j as a proportion of the total production of the purchasing sector j.  These coefficients 
form the A matrix in eq. 7.  The equation is an accounting identity stating that sectoral production q is 
equal to the intermediate deliveries  A q plus final demand  f.  The equation can be used to predict an 
endogenous  vector  of  sectoral  production,  q,  from  an  appropriately  inverted  matrix  of  technical 
coefficients, (I -A) -1, and a vector of exogenous final demand, f. 
 q = A q + f = (I -A) -1 f = M l  f       (7)
                        
 The inverted matrix is the multiplier matrix, and is denoted by M.
        Table 4.1 gives the multiplier matrix for UAE in 2003. Each column shows the effects of an injection of 
one unit of final demand  in one sector on that sector and on other sectors.  An injection of 1 unit in 
agriculture  generates  1.016  in  agriculture  and  0.227  in  other  sectors  leading  to  a  total  multiplier  for 
agriculture of 1.243.  The highest multiplier happens to be that of public utilities giving 1.673, the lowest is 
that of oil giving 1.089, which is due to a greater detachment of the oil sector from the circular flow of the 
economy.
10 A greater number staying longer hinders mobility and upgrading of skills. Several sources estimate that 53.7% of 
the migrant population and 51.1% of the migrant labour force of 1995 had been staying in UAE for five years or 
more. Comparable percentages for those who stayed for ten years or more were, respectively, 30.7% and 29.6%. 
Stickiness of migrant workers is also manifested in their response to a controlled expulsion in late 1996 when the 
authorities  expelled  around  200  thousand  immigrants  without  valid  visas.   However,  many  of  them returned 
through official channels after a six-month embargo. 
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       To identify the sectors to which the growth of the economy is geared to, some additional analysis of the 
multipliers is required. Besides comparing the levels of the multipliers, it is also important to study the 
distribution of the multiplier effects on the respective sectors and households and assess the underlying 
structural bias. For instance, one should ask how the output multipliers of an injection in sector s' distribute 
themselves on the individual sectors s. Eq. (8) develops such a  Relative Distributive Measure of sector on 
sector effects ss',  denoted by RDMss' , from the multipliers matrix M, in table 4. 
( )
( ) 0,
0,
,
',
' /1,
- 
ss
s
ssas
ss'ssa
ss Output
Output
M
dM
RDM ∑−∑=                                                      (8)
where the individual multiplier effect of s' on s , Ma,ss'  , is divided by the column sum of multipliers of s 
after deducting the initial injection. Here we use d ss’ for the Kronecker symbol that equals 1 if s=s’ and o 
in other cases. The result is divided by the actual output share of sector s in year 0, as found in the input 
output table for the base year, table 1 , last column.. For values of  RDMss' >1, <1, and = 1, there are 
positive, negative and neutral redistributive effects. For instance, values of RDMss' = 1 mean that sectoral 
injections would reproduce exactly the sectoral distribution pattern of the base year.
Values of  RDMhs' =1 mean that sectoral injections would reproduce exactly the initial distribution 
pattern of the base year.  A positive value for a particular sector s would mean an increase in its output 
share relative to the base year; a negative value would mean deterioration. 
     To demonstrate the case of an injection in agriculture on agriculture, eq. 8 will give 
{ (1.016-1.0) / (1.243 – 1.0) } / .0254 = (.016/.243) / .0254 = .0658 / .0254 = 2.59 . The case for an 
injection in agriculture on oil gives RDM={ (.001) / .243 } / .237 = .017. For an injection in agriculture 
on wholesale RDM is 2.69.
       It can then be calculated what is the RDM in UAE of uniform injections on all sectors on each 
sector.  This is shown in the last column of table 4.1, and that is what matters.  The results show that 
sectors  that  succeed  in  gaining  a  higher  share  than  their  actual  are  manufacturing,  electricity, 
construction, wholesale, and transport.  Of these construction is the highest.  All other remaining sectors 
are  oriented  towards  losing  their  shares  s  in  the  economy.11  These  multiplier  results  can  now be 
combined with recent tendencies in the use of labour in the various sectors, as shown in table 4.2.  The 
construction sector, which has the highest positive production growth bias in the multiplier analysis, is 
found also to manifest the highest decline in labour productivity; and thus 
11 The declining share of the government sector is due to the specific formulation whereby indirect taxes paid by the 
sectors to the government are not considered in the input-output analysis.
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Table 4.1.  UAE Multiplier
 prim
ary sector 
crude oil, natural gas 
m
anufacturing 
electricity, gas,w
ater 
construction 
w
holesale retail trade 
repairing services &
 
restaurants, hotels 
transports, storage, 
com
m
unication 
finance, insurance
 real estate 
personal services 
governm
ent service 
 (a) sum
 (b) 1 - sum
( c) M
ultiplier percentage 
distribution on sectors
(d) A
ctual percentage 
distribution of sectors
(e) R
D
M
primary 1.016 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.008 1.072 0.072 0.021 0.025 0.812
crude oil 0.001 1.001 0.014 0.213 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.004 1.251 0.251 0.072 0.237 0.303
manufacturing 0.036 0.018 1.082 0.078 0.310 0.068 0.073 0.020 0.053 0.112 1.848 0.848 0.243 0.167 1.449
electricity 0.005 0.002 0.007 1.033 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.002 0.025 0.013 1.122 0.122 0.035 0.025 1.421
construction 0.015 0.054 0.030 0.211 1.036 0.074 0.119 0.063 0.030 0.297 1.928 0.928 0.265 0.129 2.051
wh rt  trade 0.137 0.005 0.234 0.022 0.079 1.023 0.052 0.006 0.015 0.029 1.603 0.603 0.172 0.121 1.423
transport 0.020 0.004 0.038 0.056 0.024 0.017 1.171 0.004 0.008 0.012 1.353 0.353 0.101 0.081 1.248
finance 0.010 0.004 0.019 0.044 0.024 0.060 0.027 1.023 0.011 0.028 1.249 0.249 0.071 0.106 0.675
persl services 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.001 1.009 0.000 1.027 0.027 0.008 0.020 0.395
gvrn services 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004 1.003 1.043 0.043 0.012 0.089 0.138
total 1.243 1.089 1.437 1.673 1.502 1.279 1.487 1.121 1.162 1.506 13.498 3.498  
 rank (7) (10) (5) (1) (3) (6) (4) (9) (8) (2)     
Sources: UAE multipliers from inverted inpiu-output table.  (a)= sum of rows.  (b)= 1-(a).  (c) = for 
example, 0.021= .072/ 3.498 (d) = observed actual percentage distribution of sectors. (e)  RDM = (c)/(d)
Table 4.2. Multiplier growth bias and labour productivity growth features by sector, UAE.
sector RDM
1995-2003
RDM rank Average annual 
growth rate of 
labour 
productivity 
1994-1998
Growth of labour 
productivity rank
primary sector 0.81170 Declining,7 1.012 Stable, 3
crude oil and natural gas 0.30287 Not applicable 0.826 Not applicable
manufacturing industries 1.44906 Rising, 2 0.942 Declining, 10
electricity, gas and water 1.42090 Rising, 5 0.989 Stable,7
construction 2.05128 Rising, 1 0.939 Declining, 12
wholesale, retail trade                  (a) 1.42271 Rising, 3 0.942 Declining, 11
restaurants, hotels                        (a) 1.42271 Rising, 4 0.997 Stable, 5
transports, storage, communication 1.24807 Rising, 6 1.038 Rising, 2
finance, insurance                         (b) 0.67502 Declining,8 1.049 Rising, 1
real estate,business services         (b) 0.67502 Declining,9 0.979 Stable, 8
social, personal services               (c) 0.39518 Declining,10 1.008 Stable ,4
domestic services                          (c) 0.39518 Declining,11 0.990 Stable, 6
government services sector 0.13845 Declining,12 0.973 Stable,9
Sources: RDM from input output multipliers. Several sectors are combined in the input output table.  This applies 
to sectors indicated by a, b, and c. Column 4 is from TANMIA reports in References.
    
accentuating  the  dualistic  character  of  economic  development.   This  feature  is  also  shared  by  the 
manufacturing sector and the wholesale and retail trade sector.  All three sectors are drivers of economic 
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growth and contain significant portions of the modern economy, but these sectors are also inclined to 
absorb increasingly more labour and cause a decline in the aggregate labour productivity. Most of the 
labour absorbed is less skilled, so that the decline in labour productivity in equivalent terms is greater. 
The only sector that counteracts these dualistic tendencies is the transport, storage and communications 
sector, having a positive growth bias and a rising labour productivity. All other sectors appear to play 
lesser prominent roles in the dualistic tendencies.12
5. On the optimal degrees of dualistic development and open economy   
       
The duality tendencies displayed in the previous sections are the result  of the liberal policy towards 
granting work licenses, and admitting foreign labour, which is further strengthened by the multi- level 
decentralised system of granting work permits, and the exclusion of minimum educational  levels  as 
conditions for admission. The duality tendencies are also due to built-in mechanismas at the sector level.
       However, it  can be rightly questioned: If the oversupply of low productivity labour drags the 
statistical profile of productivity downwards but does not affect the higher branch of the economy in real 
terms, so why worry? Besides, the welfare gains in UAE are permitted to be shared by enterprising 
migrant workers from the region and this is an esteemed goal by itself, that can be seen to have positive 
externalities for UAE as an attractive and a stabilising partner in the region.  The open door strategy has 
worked in the past, brought welfare, and if it can be prolonged, why not?    
       So, does duality matter? And if it matters, what is the trade-off between an open-ended liberal 
economy,  and a reduced duality.  Economically speaking,  as long as there is  a large supply of  low 
productivity labour in neighbouring countries that is prepared to migrate to GCC and earn a wage lower 
than its marginal productivity, there is economically no harm in letting the low and the high productivity 
segments grow independently of each other, and thus manifesting an increasing statistical duality, so as 
to say on paper.  The need for and the advantages of integrating the two segments arise when the low 
productivity labour becomes scarce.  Under scarcity, less dualism and more integration will bring about 
advantages  of  economies  of  scale  and  scope.   Of  course,  more  arguments  are  readily  found  from 
demographic, sociological and political perspectives that favour integrative processes on dualistic 
processes.  
        Accepting that at some point in time dualism matters, then what is the optimal degree of duality in 
the light of a liberal policy towards the inflow and outflow of manpower. Some conceptual reflections 
can  be  made  on  the  issue,  making  use  of  Figure  5.1  below.  Curve A shows how the total  cost  of 
12 Needless to say, the above results need to be qualified to the extent of the known limitations to an I.O. analysis and 
the available data for UAE.
12
prospective damage due to duality decreases as the degree of control and economic integration between the 
two segments increase. Curve B shows how a greater degree of control and a less liberal policy towards 
labour mobility will bring more cost on the community more in terms of foregone economic welfare. By 
adding the two curves together curve C is obtained. The optimum balance between costs and benefits is 
achieved by a degree of control that will minimize the total cost to the community. This optimum degree of 
control (Q) does not eliminate all the bad side effects of a dualism; there is thus such a conceptual thing as 
an optimum degree of dualism.  The degree of control may expand for as long as the total benefits 
exceed the total costs. The optimum degree of control is reached as soon as the total cost is equal to the 
total benefit. The optimum degree of control is therefore that which minimizes the total costs of control and 
damage. 
       In the real world it is hardly possible to draw the above curves.  Policy makers dealing with a certain  
issue and alternative paths try often to make a judgement as to where their countries are positioned regarding 
the alternatives vis a vis other comparable countries.   Most often the policy makers of country A will try to 
close ranks with the set of countries to which country A belongs, and would follow policies that converge 
and convert towards the median position and empirical norms.  
       Given the above, the next section examines dualities in UAE in the context of the GCC, with the 
purpose of reflecting on median positions.  
Figure 5.1.
 
 
6. Dualities in UAE and GCC:  Comparative performance in the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ economy 
We extend in this section the scope of duality to the treatment of what has been called the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’ economy. How do these two branches relate to each other in UAE and in the other GCC? 
The plan of this section is to take up a number of indicators with readily available data and compare their 
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values for UAE and the average or total for GCC as a whole, including UAE.  We discuss first indicators 
that reflect on and can be interpreted in terms of the ‘old’ economy, and second take up those relating to the 
‘new’ economy, which is technologically the much more advanced segment, and whose development and 
growth is much more recent.
       Indicators that reflect on the old economy. It is generally recognised that the achievement pace in 
industrial development in the UAE is ahead of the GCC. While the absolute number of industrial 
establishments in UAE and Saudi Arabia are close to each other, table 6.1; in relative terms the 
number of industrial establishments per capita is much higher in UAE than in Saudi Arabia or the 
other GCC.      In spite of the greater industrial development of UAE compared to other GCC countries, as 
     Table 6.1.  Number of  Industrial  Operating  Establishments in GCC Countries  in  1998
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar
Saudi 
Arabia
U A E Total
Total 327 725 751 382 3,004 2,054 7,243 
     Source: Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting: “Industrial  Data  Bank” GOIC: http://www.goic.org.qa/  
indicated by table 6.1, the industrial structure in UAE hides much more diversity in its manufacturing 
establishments that  is inclined towards smaller and traditionally operating units, with less capital labour 
intensity,  than the case in the other GCC.  Comparative figures in the next two tables reveal a greater 
prominence  of  lower  productivities  in  the  old  economy in  UAE than  in  GCC taken  as  a  whole,  the 
underlying cause behind this being the overcrowding of the old economy with cheap foreign labour inflow. 
      Table 6.2 shows a relatively greater occurrence of small firms in the manufacturing sector in UAE as 
compared to GCC. About 44% of manufacturing falls in the category of small firms in UAE; the figure for 
GCC is 39%. The medium and large together form 56% in UAE, and for 61% in GCC. To the extent that 
small firms are associated with lower productivities and the informal sector this will show itself up in a 
greater duality in UAE as compared to GCC. 
Table 6.2.Manufacturing:  Distribution of the number of firms by size, 1998
Small Medium  & 
large
Total %  small  in 
total
% medium & 
large in total
UAE 806 1040 1846 43.7% 56.3%
GCC 2766 4322 7088 39.0% 61.0%
Source: Shiha, M. (2000) P.22.  Base of size distribution is the number of workers in the firm.
         In Table 6.3 we present data on the number of firms in the manufacturing, their capital investment and 
their employed labour. In manufacturing it is generally the case that the higher the capital/labour intensity 
the greater is the productivity of the activity.  The results for manufacturing show that the intensity amounts 
to 56,306 US dollars of capital per worker in UAE, as compared to 145,467 in GCC; reflecting the greater 
share of tiny and small enterprises in UAE referred to earlier as a cause of the low productivity.
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Table 6.3. Manufacturing: number of firms, capital, labour, and capital/labour intensity, 1998 
Count
ry
N
umbe
r  of 
firms
% Total Capital 
investment 
mil  US$
% Total 
number  of 
labour
% Capital
/labour
in US$
UAE 1846 26.0  8362  10.3  148509  26.6 56306
GCC 7088 100 81367 100 559352 100 145467
Source: Shiha, M. (2000) P.21
The relatively greater occurrence of low productivity activities in UAE than GCC correlate with the 
relative magnitude of foreign labour inflow in UAE and GCC as can be seen from table 6.4. In 1985-95 
foreign workers grew annually by 6.2% in UAE as compared to 4.5% in GCC.  The result is a labour 
force with 88% expatriates in UAE as compared to 74% in GCC.  As this inflow puts a downward 
pressure on the labour productivity, this pressure is bound to be greater in UAE than in GCC. 
Table 6.4  National and foreign labour force ,  in millions, distribution and growth, 1985 – 1995.
Country National Foreign Total National
%  in 
total
Foreign
%  in 
total
National
%  annual 
growth  
Foreign
%  annual 
growth
UAE 0.11 0.85 0.96 11.6 % 88.4% 5.5% 6.2%
GCC 2.53 7.04 9.57 26.4% 73.6% 2.1% 4.5%
Source: Girgis ,2000 .
       Indicators that reflect on the ‘new’  economy. The next four brief tables give an idea on the magnitude 
and shape of inputs that determine productivity performance in the new modern economy, in particular the 
high tech. Table 6.5 gives expenditure on higher education per capita in UAE and GCC. The figures show 
that UAE’s devotes about half the resources per capita compared to GCC, i.e. 63 US$ compared to 102 US$. 
Table 6.5. Expenditures on higher education institutes in million US$, expenditure per capita, 1996.  
Countr
y
Ministry 
of  higher 
Educatio
n
Govern
ment
Univers
ities
Non  –
govern
ment
Univers
ities
Governm
ent
Technical 
Institutes
Non  –
governm
ent
Technical 
Institutes
 Total
Expendit
ure  in  all 
higher 
education
Per  capita 
expenditure 
on  higher 
education
(US $ )
UAE 6.2 103 23.1 11.8 6.1 150.2 63
GCC 98.2 2 827.9 37.3 125 6.1 3094.5 102
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of 
Science and Technology Indicators, 1998 ( E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/Rev. 1)
 
Going a step further by focusing on science and technology (S and T) within higher education, it is 
apparent from table 6.6 that UAE focuses slightly more on these disciplines than GCC, with 38% studying 
these topics in UAE as compared to 34% in GCC.   
Table 6.6. Number of Students according to level, and percentage of these students studying a Science 
and Technology discipline (S and T), 1996
Country Bachelor’s Master’s Ph.D. Higher dipl Technical inst Total
UAE
Total number   14 691 213 294 0 2 952 18 150
15
% of S and T      33.3 54.5 55.4 0 59.4 38.1
GCC
Total number
% of S and T
282 835
31.67
7 069
46.78
2 915
53.13
1 634
14.73
30 067
56.97
324520
33.88
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of 
Science and Technology Indicators, 1998 ( E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/Rev. 1)
The general picture of relatively less resources put in higher education in UAE, applies to R and D as 
well, as shown in  table 6.7.  
Table 6.7. R & D expenditure and number of full –time equivalent researchers and support staff, 1996
Coun
try 
R  and  D 
expenditu
re 
(Millions 
of  US 
dollars)
R  and 
D 
expendi
ture per 
capita
Numbe
r  of 
FTE 
researc
hers 
Number of 
FTE 
researchers 
per 
100,000 
persons
Number  of 
R  and  D 
support 
personnel
Number of R 
and  D 
support 
personnel 
per  100,000 
population
Ratio  of  R 
and  D 
expenditure 
to   number 
of  FTE 
researchers 
UAE   10.89 4.64  107   4.5    206 8.6 101.7
GCC 294.05 11.52 1 595   6.1 2 868 11 184.4
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of 
Science and Technology Indicators 1998 (E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/3)
The staffing of the R and D effort in public institutions appears to be less experienced in UAE than in 
GCC as apparent from table 6.8, with more MSc than PhD degrees held in UAE. These are evenly divided 
in GCC.
 Table 6.8. Distribution of Full – Time Equivalent  Researchers (FTER), 1996
Country PhD FTER MSc FTER Total FTER
UAE
number   38   69  107
%distributio 35.5 64.5 100
GCC
number 781 814 1595
% 48.97 51.03 100
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of 
Science and Technology Indicators 1998(E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/3)
    So much for direct and indirect statistics on productivity enhancing inputs in higher education and in 
R and D, which are evidently directed to and focused on the modern segment. The publicly financed 
input in UAE is on average lower than in GCC.  There is no data to compliment the picture with private 
and corporate sources of finance for R and D, though this may be substantial in UAE.
 The next set of indicators deals with outcomes as a result of the above documented input effort. 
There are in total ten different indicators pertaining to various activities in the high tech modern segment 
that  will  be  reviewed  below.   They  relate  in  various  ways  to  different  factor  productivities  and 
productivity performance. Practically all these indicators will be shown to point to higher performance 
levels of UAE as compared to GCC.
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  Table 6.9 shows the extent of published papers in S and T disciplines, and those that were jointly co-
authored with foreign institutions. Two productivity indicators can be calculated.  The number of papers per 
full time equivalent researcher shows UAE performing less than GCC in 1990 but is catching up in 1995, 
with  about  1.3  publication  per  FTER,  compared  to  1.7  for  GCC.   Notwithstanding,  the  international 
exposure of the research effort in UAE is greater than in GCC, with twice as much international exposure. 
The table shows the joint percentage for UAE at 40% and for GCC at 21%. 
Table 6.9. Publications. Productivity indicators of papers per FTER  and the share of joint papers. 1990  
and 1995
Country 1990 1995
Total  No.  of 
papers
Product
ivity 
papers/
FTER
Joint 
paper
s
Joint 
%
Total 
No.  of 
papers
Product
ivity 
papers/
FTER
Joint 
paper
s
Joint
 %
UAE 49 0.46 33 67.3 137 1.28 55 40.1
GCC 1,722 1.08 468 27.2 2, 716 1.70 568 20.9
Source: ESCWA 1999 “Science and Technology Policies and Strategies for the Twenty First Century”.P.13.
    
       Table 6.10 presents electronically published data on patents originating from a number of the GCC 
countries that registered in the United States during the period 1990- 1999. While no information is available 
on the patent title or area of application, the small number of patents registered by operators in the GCC is 
noteworthy.  The comparatively small number of 170 patents generated, probably by foreign institutions 
operating in the Gulf countries, indicates the initially low level of innovative activity taking place in the 
region compared with other developing countries with a longer experience in technological development 
such as Korea,  Chile,  and others,  with ranges between 356 and 1343 patents during the same period. 
Calculating the number of patents per billion dollars of invested capital gives a productivity index for UAE 
of 1.8 patents, which is not far from that for the GCC of 2.1 patents.  In interpreting patent figures, it is 
important to keep in mind that innovative firms may prefer not to file for patent rights for their innovations, 
such a decision being part of its competitive strategy.  There is no information on this aspect in UAE and 
GCC.  
Table 6.10. Number of registered United States patents originating from the Gulf, 1990- 1999.
Country 1990-
94
1995  –
99
Total
Patents 
Capital investment 
billion.  $
Patents/  capital 
investment
UAE 7 8 15 8.36 1.79
GCC 50 120 170 81.37 2.09
Source: United States Patent and Trademark office web site: www.uspto.gov 
       Table 6.11 provides an overview of technology transfer activities undertaken by GCC countries in areas 
that relate to information and telecommunication technologies during the period 1992 and 1998. The highest 
value of contracts in information technologies is achieved by UAE, followed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.  The 
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highest value of contracts in telecommunication technologies are achieved by Saudi Arabia followed by 
UAE, Kuwait.  On the average, the figures of contract values per capita show UAE to be three times as 
much as the GCC, compare 694 US$ for UAE with 229 US$ for GCC. This supports the argument that as 
far as productive performance in the high tech modern sector is concerned, the UAE performs remarkably 
much better than the GCC. 
   
Table 6.11. Contracts Involving Technology Transfer in Information Technology and 
Telecommunications, in millions of US dollars. 1992-1998.
Country / area Populati
on  in 
millions
Information 
Technology
Telecommunicatio
ns
Information
technology  plus 
telecommunication
Value   US$ p.c. Value US$ p.c. Value US$ p.c.
 United Arab Emirates 2.345 46.0 20 1587.6 674 1633.6 694
GCC 25.533 132.3 14 4468.5 215 4600.8 229
Source:  Middle East Economic Digest : MEED 1992-1998
        Table 6.12 provides data on advanced methods of information technology and communication 
networks in the Gulf countries. In terms of internet subscribers per 1,000 people, the UAE has the highest 
number.  The same applies for internet users.  In terms of internet host per 10,000 people, the highest 
number was registered in UAE as well. The highest number of top level domain names was registered in 
UAE.  The largest number of personal computer per 1,000 people was registered in Qatar, followed directly 
by UAE. Finally, the largest number of cellular subscribers was registered again in UAE. These were six 
indicators relating to productivity in the ‘new’ economy,  All indicators show that UAE occupies the top 
position in the GCC region, suggesting that the most advanced technological branch of the economy is 
performing at a higher level of productivity in UAE than the GCC region. 
       Table  6.12.  Performance  indicators  of  advanced  methods  of  information  technology  and  
communication networks, around 2000. Facilities per 1,000 peersons, except dmain names. 
UAE 66.8 166.9 822 106.2 2.1 19.718
GCC 12.3 32.4 98 57.9 6..3 28.441
Sources: Internet Arab World Magazine 2000, ITU web site http: // www.itu.int  2000, Internet Software Consortium 
domain surveys of January 2000,  http: // www.isc.org  
7. Consolidation of the comparative results
The results of the above indicators can be consolidated to give a more compact standpoint as regards the 
extent of dualities in UAE and the GCC. We treat first  indicators that reflect indirectly on the ‘old’ 
economy, and take up later the ‘new’ economy, which is technologically much more modern oriented.
       The old  economy. We distinguish here between two structural indicators, X . 
X1 = percentage of firms with medium and large labour size in the whole economy, from table 6.2, col.6. 
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X2 = capital labour intensity in the whole economy, from table 6.3, col. 8. 
      Although these indicators refer to the whole economy, they indirectly tell more on the old than the 
new economy since the  share  of  the  old  economy dominates  the  whole  economy.  The value of  an 
indicator for a country is indexed to fall between 0 and 1, as it is divided by, or expressed in terms of, the 
highest value between the two countries. The obtained indexed values of the two indicators are then 
averaged to give Avg that can be seen as a summary norm. 
        In Figure 7.1, the indexed values of the two X variables are plotted for UAE and GCC, as well as 
their AVG.  Fig. 7.1 demonstrates the inferiority of UAE when compared to GCC as regards structural 
features of the old economy segment. 
      Figure 7.1. Structural indicators of the old economy
        The new economy.  There is more data available on this segment that allows considering more 
indicators.  Take several Z indicators as indicative of outputs and obtain their indexed values as was 
explained. The list of Z indicators, previously examined in section 6, is below.
Z1 = research papers published per full-time equivalent researcher, (table 9, col 7)
Z2= percentage of joint papers published with international scientists, (table 9, col 9)
Z3= patents issued per billion$ of capital investment, (table 10, col 6)
Z4= Contracts of ICT in dollars per capita, (table 11, col 8)
Z5 to Z10= indicators of computer use, internet, cellular etc. (table 12 col 2 to col 7)
Avg= simple average of all ten indices.  
        In Figure 7.2 the indexed values of Z are plotted for the new economy in UAE and GCC. Here one sees 
opposite results to those obtained in figure 1 for the old economy. UAE is better off than GCC. Results show 
superiority of UAE in the new economy. The picture for UAE is that of a highly dualistic economy- lagging 
regarding the old economy but leaping regarding the new economy. 
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Figure 7.2.  Output indicators of the new economy
       
        Another category of indicators for the new economy is Y. These indicators relate to inputs, are 
indexed as explained earlier, and were examined in section 6 also. The indicators consist are below.
Y1 = Per capita expenditure on higher education in US $, ( table 6.5 , col 8)
Y2 = R & D expenditure per capita in US $, (table 6.7 col 3)
Y3 = |Number of FTER per 100,000 population,  (table 6.7, col 5)
Y4 =Number of R & D support personnel per 100,000 population (Source table 7, col 7)
Avg= simple average of all four input variables.
       In figure 7.3 the indexed values are plotted, showing what is already very well known: there are 
relatively less public inputs in scientific education in the UAE than in GCC.
       Now that the average results, AVG, for outputs and inputs indicators for the new economy are 
calculated, it can be further investigated in which country the relationship between outputs and inputs 
would appear to be more efficient in the new modern economy. 
Figure 7.3. Input indicators of the new economy
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       An important conclusion is that in spite of the relatively lower inputs there is on average 
higher outputs in UAE than in GCC, as can be gathered from a division of the average outputs 
of Z by the average inputs of Y.  An indicator of overall productivity in the new economy is 
obtainable by dividing output by input, as is done below.  The output /input ratio, expressed as 
Z/Y, is 1.47 for UAE, as compared to 0.52 for GCC; indicating higher efficiency in managing 
resources and reaching higher levels in the new economy in UAE compared to GCC. 
8. Concluding remarks
 If there is a prospective cost of a greater duality, such a cost needs to be weighed against the economic 
welfare advantages accruing to nationals and expatriates from a liberal policy towards human resource 
mobility that  encourages  duality.  In the longer run,  and under  increasing economic  scarcity and other 
demographic, sociological and political considerations greater degrees of integration between dual segments 
can be more optimal than no integration.
 Given the complexity of the issues it is understandable that policy directions are retrieved from the 
comparative experiences of neighbouring countries. The conclusion from a comparative empirical review of 
GCC is that the divergence in productivity levels in the UAE economy is significantly greater than in the 
other GCC economies. The ‘old’ economy in UAE lags when compared to GCC.  In contrast, the ‘new’ 
economy leaps even much more in UAE than in GCC, and is likely to be more efficiently managed in terms 
of the ratio of outputs to inputs.  The proposition that UAE economy is more dualistic than GCC is correct.
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